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Abstract
Security policy and access control models are often based on qualitative attributes, e.g. security
labels, cryptographic credentials. In this paper, we enrich one such model, namely the Chinese
Walls model, with quantitative attributes derived from data. Therefore, we advocate a data-
driven approach that considers a quantitative definition of access we term, working relations.
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1 Introduction
Organisations require controlling and monitoring the access of their information, shared
files and resources in order to ensure the security of information and assets. Access control
provides access rights to authorized users. Unauthorized users are refused to access to
information and assets. There are various access control models in the literature, including
mandatory access control, discretionary access control, role-based access control, lattice-based
information flow control and Chinese Wall Access Control (CWAC) [4, 10].
CWAC was introduced by Brewer and Nash [2] with the aim preventing information flows
that cause Conflicts of Interest (CoI) for consultants. It is considered in the commercial
domain in which consultants and analysts of organisations access sets of data resources from
different groups in companies that provide different types of services. CWAC prevents data
leaks from one company to another within the same CoI class.
CWAC, like many other models, lacks quantitative attributes and analysis that could
render the model more usable within data-driven domains. We therefore argue that such a
model should be enhanced with definitions that take into consideration statistical information
derived from available datasets. We introduce in this paper one such initial enhancement by
taking into account working relations of users towards computers they access. A working
relation represents persistent accesses that exceed some minimum number of times. We
define a new version of the simple secrecy property based on working relations.
2 Related Work
Our work is closely related to the basic concept of CWAC. We provide an overview of the
most relevant works to the this paper in the followings. CWAC is a well known access control
for the secured sharing of commercial consultancy services. A concept analysis is introduced
which shows effects of lattice structure to classify the access permission of consultants based
on the CWAC. And also helps to understand the CWAC access permission of every consultant
depends on their level in the lattice structure [12].
A new way of thinking on Chinese Wall Model Security has been brought by Cheng and
et all [3], they address risk access control decisions on the CWAC and other security policies
where access decisions are based on the history. The new concept has been illustrated as a
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Fuzzy Logic control system because of the uncertainty in security labels, risk modulating
factors and loss variance based access decision have effective roles on the access decisions.
CWAC is proposed to address the CoI problems in the decentralized work-flow environment
[13] . The modified CWAC for decentralized control that solves the various problems such
as, placing the task execution agents in same COI class’s, undesirable results that are similar
and tend to be in the wrong side of the Chinese Wall.
Formal Concept Analysis CWAC is modelled [11] , results show that the proposed method
is able to satisfy the limitation of the Chinese Wall Security Policy and its main properties
that are simple security (ss) and *-property. Similarities between CWAC security properties
and Multi-Level Security (MLS) policies’ security attributes are described by McLean [8].
Bella-LaPadula is one of the MLS policies, it has a simple security rules and *-property that
are partly similar to CWAC access rules .According to Gollmann [5], ss-property allows a
subject s to access an object o either only if object o has already been accessed by the user
or request is entirely different conflict of class. He describes *-property for restricting write
access; an object o can be accessed by a subject s only if s/he has no read access to any
conflict class object o’. All of the previous works mentioned so far, has not considered a
quantitative approach on Chinese Wall Security Model. We believe that our work is the only
work that redefines security formula of CWAC and approaches quantitative aspects of it.
3 An Overview of Chinese Wall Security Model
CWAC is one of the most common policy that is usually used in commercial organizations
[2]. The main idea behind this is that one is not allowed to access to two conflicting classes
or competitor organizations’ files at the same time. It can be described quite simply, object
that is the wrong side of the wall should not been allowed to be accessed by a subject.
CWAC has two access restriction properties; simple security rule and *-property. Simple
security rule gives an access a subject to an object if the object either is in the same company
datasets and object already accessed by subject or belongs to a completely different conflict of
interest class. Chinese Wall *-property comprises permissions on write access, it is permitted
if access is permitted by the simple security rule and object can not be read which is in
different organisation dataset than the one which write access is requested for [5].
Our model has similarities with the exist CWAC on the checking of the historical accesses
but also we have a new approach that is working relationship. In our case, if a user has
accessed to a computer more than n times then we think user has a working relationship
with that computer, hence if the user attempts to access a computer that belongs to the
CoI, then our property does not allow user. We explain our new model definitions in the
following section and we implement our new model on the real world dataset in Section 5.2.
4 A New Data-driven Chinese Walls Model
The existing Chinese Walls model [2] is based on the concept that a subject may have
accessed some object in the past that belonged to a conflicting organisation. However, the
model is coarsely defined as it relies on the single notion of access. There are no attempts in
literature to provide more refined definitions that would incorporate quantitative aspects such
as probabilistic or stochastic variations of this model. Therefore, we start with the definition
of a working relation between a subject and an object to capture such quantification in access
control. We start first by reviewing the basic concepts underlying the Chinese Walls model.
Subjects are defined as the set s, s′ . . . ∈ S. These could be users or computer machines.
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Objects are defined as the set o, o′ . . . ∈ O. These could be individual files. Companies
(represented by their datasets) are defined as the set c, c′ . . . ∈ C. There are two labeling
operations on objects. The first is y : O → C, which defines for an object the company
(dataset) to which it belongs. The second labeling operation is x : O → ℘(C), which defines
for an object, the set of companies (datasets) that are in conflict with its owner. We call this
set, the conflict class for o.
Based on the above concepts, the history of subjects’ access to objects is defined as a
matrix N : S × O → B, where Ns,o = True means that s has accessed o in the past, and
Ns,o = False means it has not. However, in our model, we redefine the history of accesses as
a numeric concept rather than a Boolean one.
I Definition 1 (Numeric History of Accesses). We define the numeric history of accesses of
objects by subjects as a matrix, N : S × O → N, which returns for each subject a natural
number, n, representing the number of times a subject s has accessed an object o in the past:
Ns,o = n
Using this new definition of the history of accesses, we can define a new relation to capture
working relationships between users and computers.
I Definition 2 (Working Relations). We say that a subject s (e.g. a user) has a working
relation with an object o (e.g. a computer) written as a predicate, wr(s, o), if and only if,
based on some predefined minimum number of accesses, n, then:
Ns,o ≥ n
In other words, s, in its history, has accessed o at least n number of times. The choice of n
depends on the organisation or on the context in which the policy is deployed. By contrast,
the standard case where s is deemed to have only accessed o, is represented by the next
definition.
I Definition 3 (Standard Access). We say that a subject s (e.g. a user) has accessed an
object o (e.g. a computer) if and only if, based on some predefined minimum number of
accesses, n, then:
n > Ns,o ≥ 1
In other words, s, in its history, has at least accessed o once, but fewer times than n.
Therefore, s has accessed o but not have had a working relation with o. Finally, the case of
no access is defined simply as as follows.
I Definition 4 (No Access). We say that a subject s (e.g. a user) has not accessed an object
o (e.g. a computer) in its history, if and only if, the following holds true:
Ns,o = 0
We now introduce the new variation of the Chinese Wall accessibility property, based on the
definition of a working relation above.
I Property 1 (Working Relations-based Simple Security). A subject, s, can access an object,
o, if and only if, for all objects o′, it must be the case that:
(wr(s, o′) = True) ⇒ (y(o) = y(o′) ∨ y(o) /∈ x(o′))
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This property weakens the original Simple Security property defined by Brewer and Nash
[2] in that it takes into account only that part of the history of the subject where accesses
to objects reached to some particular level of significance (i.e. n as defined in Definition 1).
Informally, this means that we are not worried with subjects who have accessed objects fewer
times that n in their history.
5 Case Example: LANL Dataset
5.1 Dataset Description
We use here the “User-Computer Authentication Associations in Time" (UCAAT) data-
set [6, 9] collected by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) [1], as our case ex-
ample to validate the ideas presented in the previous section. We used first five thou-
sands data from the dataset due to memory of the computer that is used for coding.
1, U1, C1
1, U1, C2
2, U2, C3
3, U3, C4
6, U4, C5
7, U4, C5
12, U8, C9
Figure 1 Ex-
ample data lines
The data ranges over 9 months and represents 708,304,516 successful
authentication events from users to computers. An example of some
lines in the dataset is shown in Figure 1.
Each line contains three metadata elements; the first represents the
time at which the authentication event occurred, the second represents
the user who logged in into the computer, and the third the computer
on which the login happened. The time epoch starts at 1 with a
resolution of 1 second. There are in total 11,362 users, represented by
the pseudo values Ui and 22,284 computers, represented by the pseudo
values Cj, where i, j represent the number of the user and the computer,
respectively. To enhance anonymity, the time frame of the actual data
collection is not provided and some centralized computers (e.g. active
directory servers) and their associated authentication events have also been removed. The
dataset is available either as a single compressed file (size 2.3GB) or as a set of 9 individual
files (sizes ranging from 177MB to 273MB).
5.2 Model Implementation Based on the Dataset
We now instantiate our new data-driven Chinese Walls model using data from the UCAAT
dataset. Due to the big size of the dataset, we selected as a proof-of-concept only the first
5000 entries. Initially, we require the number of times each user logged in to a specific
machine. Table 1 shows an example of such analysis.
We applied clustering techniques to find the value of n in the definition of working
relations. Clustering is a technique that is used to group data together [7]. It is used to
classify each data point into a specific group. We gave the number of login time, and classify
them into two groups. The numbers were clustered into two groups and the boundary number
of the numbers was 20. Therefore, in our case (for first five thousands data) n value is 20.
Table 2 represents the full list of users with working relations to computers.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have first defined a robust, quantitative model for Chinese Walls Security
Model. We have shown that our new model is suitable to apply on the real world dataset,
in our case, we have used the UCAAT dataset for implementing our quantitative Chinese
Walls Model. We have then explained the way to find out the value of the n that shows
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User Name Computer Name Number of Login Times
U1 C1 2
C2 4
C978 2
U12 C54 62
C94 8
C801 3
U66 C1 18
C117 3
C133 1
U105 C113 2
C130 3
C160 37
U106 C136 8
U116 C155 32
U127 C155 41
U13 C14 21
C172 20
C282 20
C32 30
Table 1 An example table showing the number of times users log in to computers
boundary of access times by applying clustering algorithms. Our model allows to put access
restrictions on the sensitive and personal information so that users cannot manipulate other
users’ sensitive files for their own advantages. There is an opportunity for the further work.
We plan to extend this work with quantitative description of *property. We also believe that
our model can be applied other MLS models.
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User Name Computer Name User Name Computer Name
U12 C54,C13 U105 C160
U116 C155 U120 C164
U124 C168, C192 U127 C155
U128 C167, C176 U13 C14, C172, C282, C32, C42
U130 C179 U153 C207
U156 C161 U159 C160
U16 C17, C148 U179 C175
U184 C154 U188 C256
U197 C269 U202 C275
U204 C101 U21 C22
U211 C286 U216 C291
U29 C30 U39 C41
U53 C58 U6 C7
U60 C108, C173 U63 C234, C68
U66 C1 U67 C49
U68 C71 U77 C234, C78
U93 C107,C53 U92 C154
U95 C154 U97 C161
U105 C160 U116 C155
U120 C164 U9 C10
U96 C115 U97 C116, C161
Table 2 The group of users who have working relations with computers
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